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Oregon's existing sentencing guidelines provide judges with a rational
mechanism for ensuring fair, consistent sentences that take into
consideration the relative severity of the individual crime, the criminal
history of the offender, and the resource constraints of the criminal
justice system. The usefulness of the guidelines, however, has been
eroded by separate sentencing provisions that take little or no account
of these factors. Measure 61 would be the latest of these provisions. Its
proponents contend that it addresses an absence of meaningful
sanctions under the guidelines for property crimes, particularly
repeated property crimes. The measure, however, would increase
sentences for a wide array of property and person crimes without
consideration of the need for additional incarceration—from the
standpoint of either justice or deterrence—and without consideration
of the availability of financial and other resources to provide for it.
There is little evidence that this blanket increase in the length of
criminal sentences would substantially reduce the rate of crime, but
even the proponents agree that the measure would impose hundreds
of millions of dollars in additional prison costs on the state. Such a large
commitment of state funds to prisons should not be made without
evaluating its effect on other critical state programs, including other
components of the criminal justice system. If the current sentencing
guidelines do not provide sufficiently lengthy periods of incarceration
for certain crimes, the Oregon Legislative Assembly can and should
make appropriate adjustments in the guidelines for those specific
crimes after due consideration of the financial effects of the adjustments
on other state programs. This would allow efficient use of the state's
criminal justice resources as well as allow judges to tailor sentences to
the circumstances of each individual crime and offender. Measure 61,
on the other hand, would be neither efficient nor just.
Your committee unanimously recommends a "No" vote.
The City Club membership will vote on this report on Friday, October 9,
1998. Until the membership vote, the City Club of Portland does not
have an official position on this report. The outcome of this vote will be
reported in the City Club Bulletin dated October 23,1998.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ballot Measure 61 will appear on the ballot as follows:
Caption:
Resultof"Yes"Vote:
Result of "No"Vote:
Summary:
CHANGES MINIMUM SENTENCES FOR
LISTED CRIMES, INCLUDING CERTAIN
REPEAT OFFENSES.
"Yes" vote changes minimum sentences for listed
crimes, including certain repeat offenses.
"No" vote retains present sentencing statutes and
guidelines for listed crimes, including repeat
offenses.
Establishes minimum sentences for crimes listed as
"major crimes." Provides one to three year
proportionally increased sentences for major
crimes, aggravated murder or murder if person has
one to three prior convictions for major crime
within past 10 years. Prior juvenile court
adjudications involving major crimes apply to
increase sentences. Treats prior conviction for
driving under influence of intoxicants as major
crime if current conviction is for criminally
negligent homicide using vehicle. Prohibits
temporary leave or other reduction in additional
prison time imposed under measure.
(The language of the caption, question, and summary was prepared by the
Oregon State Attorney General.)
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Because of the significance of Measure 61, and because the City Club did not
examine Measure 11 in 1994, the Research Board directed that a committee be
formed to study Measure 61. The committee was selected from a pool of City
Club members who had volunteered to participate in ballot measure studies.
The committee members were screened to ensure that they had no economic
interest in the outcome of the measure and had taken no public position on the
measure or its subject. The committee interviewed proponents and opponents of
the measure, as well as other knowledgeable people, and reviewed reports,
articles, and other information, all of which are listed in the Appendices.
Measure 61 was placed on the ballot through an initiative petition sponsored by
Kevin Mannix of Salem, a lawyer and former state legislator, and Steve Doell of
Lake Oswego, the President of Crime Victims United. The measure is in some
senses a successor to Measure 11 in 1994, which voters overwhelmingly
approved and which established mandatory minimum sentences for certain
violent crimes. Although Measure 61 applies to both violent and property
crimes, including most Measure 11 crimes, its proponents have said that the
measure's principal objective is to ensure that felony property offenders,
particularly repeat offenders, receive longer prison sentences. They contend that
existing sentences are too lenient either to provide "appropriate punishment" or
to serve as an effective deterrent to the commission of future crimes.
Measure 61 would create new statutory sentencing provisions for crimes
defined by the measure as "major crimes." These provisions would: (1) require
repeat major crime offenders to serve an additional one to three years in prison
beyond the sentence imposed for the major crime itself, and (2) establish a
"presumptive" prison sentence of 14 months for all major crimes for which the
law does not already establish a presumptive or mandatory sentence of 14
months or more. Neither the sentencing judge nor correctional authorities
would be allowed to reduce the additional sentence for repeat offenders for any
reason, but the sentencing judge could impose a sentence that was longer or
shorter than the 14-month presumptive sentence for "substantial and
compelling reasons," and correctional authorities could reduce that sentence by
up to 20 percent for good behavior.
II. BACKGROUND
To understand and evaluate Measure 61, one must understand Oregon's
existing, multi-layered system of sentencing laws. Some of these laws were
created by the state legislature, others by citizen initiative. Because these laws
are quite complex, this section begins with a relatively detailed description and
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explanation of Oregon's 1989 sentencing guidelines and the layers that have
been added to them. This is followed by a brief discussion of trends in Oregon
crime and incarceration rates, a summary of how Measure 61 would alter
Oregon's sentencing system, and discussion of Measure 61's likely financial
impact.
A. Overview of Existing Oregon Sentencing Laws
Oregon's criminal statutes establish the maximum sentence for each crime,
generally by categorizing the crime as a specified class of felony or
misdemeanor. The maximum sentences for Class A, B, and C felonies are,
respectively, 20,10, and 5 years; the maximum sentences for misdemeanors are
1 year or less. Murder and aggravated murder are among the small number of
unclassified crimes and are subject to separate sentencing provisions.
Although most crimes have specified maximum sentences, the actual sentences
imposed within these maximums are determined by other legal provisions.
Chief among these are the "sentencing guidelines." The sentencing guidelines
establish "presumptive sentences." A presumptive sentence is the standard
sentence a convicted offender receives based on a formal categorization of the
relative severity of the crime and the offender's criminal history. Judges may
impose a sentence that deviates from the presumptive sentence only for
"substantial and compelling reasons." Guideline sentences include an additional
period of post-prison supervision and may be reduced to a limited degree by
correctional authorities in order to encourage good behavior and self-
improvement. Sentencing guidelines must, ultimately, be based on the resources
of the criminal justice system.
Overlaid on the sentencing guidelines, however, are a number of separate
sentencing provisions that increase, for specified crimes and circumstances, the
time that would otherwise have been served under the guidelines. The increases
are effected through longer presumptive sentences, mandatory minimum
sentences, or prohibitions on sentence reductions by correctional authorities.
Measure 61 would employ all three of these mechanisms to increase the time
served for the crimes listed in the measure as "major crimes."
1. Sentencing Guidelines
Genesis of the Guidelines: Before the adoption of sentencing guidelines in 1989,
judges sentenced offenders to "indeterminate" sentences. An indeterminate
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sentence states a maximum period of confinement, which cannot exceed the
statutorily authorized maximum sentence. Within the limit of the judicially
imposed indeterminate sentence, however, an offender's actual period of
confinement was determined by the State Board of Parole using a matrix that
considered the severity of the offense and the criminal history of the offender.
By the late 1980s, the indeterminate sentencing system had lost public
credibility. Sentencing decisions varied substantially from judge to judge and
from county to county because there was little or no guidance for imposing
indeterminate sentences. Furthermore, the actual time served by offenders
under the parole matrix was often far shorter than the indeterminate sentence.
The problem was exacerbated by severe prison overcrowding, which required
inmates to be released sooner than they otherwise would have been in order to
make room for more dangerous inmates. For example, offenders in 1986 served
an average of only 24 percent of their judicially imposed sentences. The parole
matrix was an effort to establish priorities for allocating the state's limited
correctional resources, but releases were often made in a crisis atmosphere that
allowed little opportunity for thoughtful decisions or meaningful policy
guidance from the legislature.
To resolve these problems, the 1987 Oregon Legislature directed the Oregon
Criminal Justice Council (the predecessor of the Oregon Criminal Justice
Commission) to develop sentencing guidelines. The goals of the guidelines were
to establish sentences that were:
1. proportional to the relative severity of the crime and criminal history of the
offender;
2. applied uniformly to offenders with similar criminal histories who
committed the same crime;
3. imposed by judges, subject only to limited reductions by correctional
authorities for good behavior and participation in rehabilitation programs;
4. consistent with the available resources of the criminal justice system.
In short, the objective of the guidelines was to adopt a rational sentencing policy
that would base sentencing decisions on a wide range of considerations instead
of an ad hoc reaction to an individual crime or offender on the one hand or a
lack of prison capacity on the other hand.
Oregon's sentencing guidelines were developed from existing systems in
Minnesota and Washington but included several innovative features that have
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since been copied by other states. Among these features were (and are)
articulated principles for ranking the seriousness of crimes and a criminal
history scale that is both simpler and more sensitive to the seriousness of an
offender's criminal history. The Oregon Sentencing Guidelines Board adopted
the guidelines in November 1988 and forwarded them to the 1989 Oregon
Legislature, which approved them with amendments, effective November 1,
1989. The Oregon Criminal Justice Commission has the authority to amend the
guidelines, subject to the approval of the legislature.
Structure of the Guidelines: The guidelines employ a two-dimensional grid to
specify presumptive sentences. The vertical axis is the Crime Seriousness Scale,
which ranks the seriousness of crimes from 1 (least serious, e.g., bigamy) to 11
(most serious, e.g., murder). The horizontal axis is the Criminal History Scale,
which ranks the seriousness of the offender's criminal history (including juvenile
adjudications for acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a felony)
from I (least serious—no prior felony convictions or adult Class A misdemeanor
convictions) to A (most serious—three or more prior convictions for "person,"
i.e., violent, felonies). For example, the presumptive sentence for a person
convicted of negligent homicide (category 8) with a single prior conviction for
burglarizing an occupied dwelling (a "person" felony—category D) would be
found in grid block 8-D: 27 to 28 months in prison. (The statutory maximum
sentence for negligent homicide, a Class C felony, is 5 years (60 months).)
Sentencing Guidelines Grid
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A judge may impose a sentence that is longer or shorter than the presumptive
sentence—known as a "departure"—but only if there are "substantial and
compelling reasons" for doing so. The guidelines include a nonexclusive list of
"aggravating" and "mitigating" factors that may justify an upward (increased
sentence) or downward (decreased sentence) departure, respectively. Among
the listed aggravating factors are:
• persistent involvement in similar offenses (by far the most commonly cited
factor),
• the vulnerability of the victim,
• the use of a weapon,
• multiple victims,
• exceptional harm or loss, and
• crimes motivated by the race, ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation of the
victim.
An unlisted but frequently cited aggravating factor is commission of the crime
while under some form of correctional supervision, such as post-prison
supervision or work release.
Among the listed mitigating factors are:
• cooperation with the state (the most commonly cited),
• diminished mental capacity (excluding voluntary drug or alcohol abuse),
• acting in a minor or passive role, and
• the availability of a treatment program that is more likely to prevent
continued criminal behavior than imprisonment.
The parties may also negotiate and agree to a departure. Upward departures are
generally limited to double the maximum presumptive sentence, or—if the
presumptive sentence is probation—1 to 3 years, depending on the crime
seriousness category.
Probation, Sentence Reductions, and Post-Prison Supervision: Under the
guidelines, the presumptive sentence is "probation" for all category 1 through 3
crimes and for category 4 through 7 crimes associated with the less serious
criminal history categories. Probation in this context, however, means a sentence
other than a "prison" sentence. Under Oregon law, sentences of 12 months or
less must be served in local jails rather than state prisons. Thus, a sentence of
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"probation" under the guidelines may include, and more often than not does
include, a short period of confinement in the local jail or some other punitive
sanction, such as work release, as a condition of probation. For presumptive
probation sentences, the guidelines specify a presumptive number of "sanction
units" that may be included in the sentence. Sanction units establish the
maximum amount of time that must be served in various forms of custodial
supervision, including jail, custodial treatment facilities, release programs, house
arrest, and community service.
The presumptive term of probation is 18 months to five years, depending on the
crime category, but the sentencing judge may impose a different term of up to
five years under certain circumstances or as a "departure." Probation may be
revoked for a violation of its conditions or for new criminal activity. If the
presumptive sentence was probation, a sentence of up to six months may be
imposed upon revocation. If the presumptive sentence was prison, a sentence of
up to the maximum presumptive sentence may be imposed.
Prior to the adoption of the sentencing guidelines, prison inmates could
substantially reduce their sentences through good behavior (a one-third
reduction), prison work, and enrollment in educational programs. Correctional
authorities may reduce guideline sentences, however, by a maximum of only 20
percent for good behavior and participation in functional literacy programs.
Although one of the fundamental goals of the sentencing guidelines is "truth in
sentencing," i.e., to ensure that judicially imposed sentences are actually served,
a modest provision for sentence reductions by correctional authorities was
maintained in order to provide incentives for maintaining prison order and
encouraging inmate rehabilitation.
All sentences under the guidelines, including probation revocation sentences,
include a term of post-prison community supervision, which replaces the
former parole system. The term is one year for crime seriousness categories 1
through 3, two years for categories 4 through 6, and three years for categories 7
through 11. (If the total length of incarceration plus post-prison supervision
would exceed the statutory maximum sentence for the crime, the period of post-
prison supervision must be reduced so that the statutory maximum sentence is
not exceeded.) The State Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision may
impose sanctions, including jail, for violations of post-prison supervision
conditions.
Statistical Information on Sentencing Practices Under the Guidelines:
Statistical information, allow limited, shows that judges are much more likely to
increase a presumptive sentence than to reduce it. During 1994, the most recent
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year for which statewide data is available, judges departed from the guideline
sentences in approximately one-fourth of all cases. Upward departures were
about twice as common as downward departures. "Dispositional departures"—
a prison sentence when the presumptive sentence is probation or probation
when the presumptive sentence is prison—occurred in approximately 10
percent of cases, with upward dispositional departures being four times more
common than downward dispositional departures. The upward dispositional
departures occurred most often when the offender had a lengthy criminal
record. For example, in crime history category A (three or more person felonies),
the upward dispositional departure rate was as high as high as 74 percent, and
in category E (four or more non-person felonies), the upward dispositional
departure rate was as high as 40 percent.
The percentage of felony offenders sentenced to prison and to jail and the length
of prison time served all increased from 1986 (three years before the adoption of
the guidelines) to 1994. The percentage of felons sentenced to prison increased
from 18 to 22 percent. Felons sentenced to local jails in conjunction with
probation increased from 31 percent to 45 percent. Felons receiving probation
without jail fell from 49 percent to 31 percent. Average prison time served
increased from 16 months to 25 months, with the largest increases for person
crimes.
2. Other Sentencing Provisions, Including Mandatory Minimum Sentences
Several statutory provisions substantially limit the influence of the guidelines on
sentencing decisions.
Use of a Firearm. The use of a firearm during the commission of a felony may
result in the imposition of minimum sentences ranging from 5 to 30 years,
depending on the nature of the weapon and the number of previous convictions
for the use of a firearm during the commission of a felony. For first offenses, the
sentencing judge has the discretion to impose a sentence in accordance with the
sentencing guidelines. Minimum sentences may by reduced by up to 20 percent
for good behavior, but offenders are not eligible for other forms of early release
or work release.
1988 Measure 4—Determinate Sentences for Certain Repeated Felonies. In 1988,
just as the sentencing guidelines were being adopted, the voters
overwhelmingly approved an initiative measure (Ballot Measure 4) that
required a determinate sentence for specified felonies if the person had
previously been convicted of any of the felonies. Probation, parole, and sentence
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reductions for good behavior or other reasons are prohibited for these sentences.
The felonies subject to Measure 4 are aggravated murder, murder, and the first
degree of manslaughter, assault, kidnapping, rape, sodomy, unlawful sexual
penetration, burglary, arson, and robbery. Apart from the prohibition on
probation, no specific sentence is required, but the guideline sentence must be
applied if it is more stringent.
1994 Measurell—Mandatory Minimum Sentences for Certain Person Felonies.
In 1994, the voters approved an initiative measure (Ballot Measure 11) that
mandates lengthy prison terms for a wide variety of person felonies, including:
murder and attempted murder; manslaughter, assault, kidnapping, rape,
sodomy, unlawful sexual penetration, and robbery in the first and second
degrees; arson and sexual abuse in the first degree; using a child in a display of
sexually explicit conduct; and compelling prostitution. Except for murder (25
years), the mandatory minimum sentences range from 5 years and 10 months to
10 years. The sentencing judge has no discretion to impose a shorter sentence,
and the offender is not eligible for any form of sentence reduction, such as credit
for good behavior. In 1997, the Oregon Legislature modified Measure 11 to
allow judges—under narrowly defined circumstances—to impose guideline
sentences for assault, kidnapping, and robbery in the second degree.
1996 Presumptive Sentence Increases for Certain Property Crimes. The
sentencing guidelines treat violent crimes much more seriously than property
crimes. To free correctional capacity for persons who commit violent crimes, the
presumptive sentences for property crimes are probation or relatively brief
prison sentences, even for repeat offenders. Although, as noted above, judges
frequently imposed substantial upward departure sentences on repeat
offenders, the frequency with which judge choose to increase sentences was
perhaps an indication that the guideline sentences for repeat property offenders
were too lenient. To address this problem—and in an apparent effort to preempt
an initiative similar to Measure 61—a special session of the legislature in 1996
passed substantial increases in the presumptive sentences for certain repeated
property crimes.
The crimes addressed by the 1996 legislation include: burglary in the first
degree (for which the presumptive sentence for repeat offenses was increased to
19 months) and unauthorized use of a vehicle, possession of a stolen vehicle,
trafficking in stolen vehicles, theft and aggravated theft in the first degree,
burglary in the second degree, and criminal mischief in the first degree (for
which the presumptive sentence for repeat offenses was increased to 13
months).
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The number and type of previous convictions necessary to trigger these
provisions varies for each of the listed crimes, but, for example, a single previous
conviction of burglary in the first degree or unauthorized use of a vehicle is
sufficient to trigger the provisions for a second conviction of the same crime. As
with all presumptive sentences, the sentencing judge is authorized to impose a
shorter sentence or probation as a downward departure for "substantial and
compelling reasons." Your committee was told, however, that such departures
have been rare to date.
B. Trends in Oregon Crime and Incarceration Rates
Crime statistics are notoriously difficult to interpret and can be easily
manipulated to support one view or another. In particular, because of
differences in reporting and data gathering techniques, state-to-state
comparisons must be viewed with extreme caution. With those significant
caveats, the following general observations can be made.
Crime rates (i.e., the number of crimes committed for a given population) for
both violent and property crimes in Oregon are essentially the same now as they
were 20 years ago. Although year-to-year variations have occurred, there has
been no long-term upward or downward trend.
The violent crime rate, expressed as crimes per 100,000 residents, was 438.5 in
1975 and 463.1 in 1996. The rate in 1996, however, was the lowest since 1977.
The proponents of Measure 61 have attributed recent decreases in violent crime
to tougher sentencing provisions, particularly the approval of Measure 11 in
1994, but the violent crime rate peaked in 1985 at 551.1 and dropped
significantly before the approval of Measure 11. Although Measure 11 may
have had some effect on violent crime, dearly other factors were at work. It is
also worth noting that Oregon's violent crime rate ranged from the 11th to 17th
highest in the nation from 1975 to 1979 but since 1990 has ranked no higher than
26th and has been as low as 30th.
Similarly, the property crime rate was 6313.7 in 1975 but only 5533.6 in 1996. The
rate increased during the early 1990s after a dramatic decline between 1988 and
1990, but the rate is still lower than the rates from the early and mid-1980s.
Again, it is difficult to attribute these short-term trends to any change in
sentencing policies. With respect to state-to-state comparisons, Oregon's
property crime rate is relatively high, ranking 9th in 1996 after ranking 5th in
1994 and 1995. Oregon, however, ranked 5th in 1975 and 4th in 1985 and has
never ranked lower than 16th over the past 20 years. Some have attributed the
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high ranking to relatively high crime reporting rates in Oregon; others have
attributed it to Oregon's policy of reserving limited prison and jail space for
violent offenders. No convincing evidence exists, however, for any one
explanation.
Although by international standards Oregon's prison incarceration rate is
extremely high (twice as high or more than the rates in most industrialized
countries), the rate is low by United States standards. Oregon's incarceration
rate has approximately doubled since the mid-1970s, and its prison population
has increased 44.9 percent from 1992 to 1997. But its 1997 incarceration rate of
232 sentenced prisoners (i.e., persons sentenced to more than one year) per
100,000 residents was the tenth lowest in the nation and the second lowest in the
West (after Utah). In 1997, Oregon's prisons were at 105 percent of their
operating capacity, but the state is rapidly increasing its prison capacity with
new construction.
C Sentencing Changes That Would Be Effected by Measure 61
Measure 61 would change existing sentencing rules in two ways. First, any
person convicted of a "major crime," as defined in the measure, would be
required to serve an additional mandatory minimum sentence of 1,2, or 3 years
if the person had, respectively, 1,2, or 3 or more "previous convictions" for a
"major crime" or murder or aggravated murder within the preceding 10 years.
A "previous conviction" would include juvenile adjudications (the term for a
judgement in a juvenile court process) for acts that, if committed by an adult,
would constitute a "major crime." In addition, "previous convictions" would
include other convictions in the same proceeding as long as they were part of a
"separate criminal episode." For example, a person convicted of four separate
burglaries in the same proceeding would be subject, for the fourth burglary, to a
mandatory sentence of three years based on the three "previous" burglary
convictions, plus the guideline sentence for the burglary. The additional
mandatory sentences could not be reduced for any reason, including good
behavior, but also could not cause the total term of imprisonment to exceed the
statutory maximum sentence for the crime.
Second, Measure 61 would amend the sentencing guidelines by establishing a
presumptive sentence of 14 months for every "major crime" for which the
presumptive or mandatory sentence was not already 14 months or more. Like
other presumptive sentences, judges could impose a longer or shorter sentence
for "substantial and compelling reasons," and the sentence could be reduced by
up to 20 percent for good behavior.
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Measure 61 is intended to ensure not only that offenders serve longer sentences
but also that they serve the sentences in state prisons instead of local jails.
Because sentences of more than 12 months must be served in prison, the
additional mandatory sentences for repeat offenders and the presumptive 14-
month sentences would send many offenders to prison who would otherwise
have been sentenced to local custody.
"Major crimes" for purposes of Measure 61 are listed below. "Major crimes"
that are also Measure 11 crimes are set forth in bold. "Major crimes" for which
the 1996 Legislative Assembly specified increased presumptive sentences for
repeat offenders are set forth in italics.
• Promoting Prostitution
• Theft by Extortion
• Criminal Mistreatment in the First Degree
• Felon in Possession of a Firearm (if the felony is a Class A or B Felony)
• Criminally Negligent Homicide (in a conviction for Criminally Negligent
Homicide that involves the use of a vehicle, a prior conviction for Driving
under the Influence of Intoxicants counts as a previous "major crime")
• Conspiracy, Attempt, or Solicitation to Commit a Class A or B Felony
• Escape in the First Degree
• Bribe Giving or Receiving or Bribing a Witness
• Perjury
• Robbery in the First Second, or Third Degree
• Assault in the First, Second, or Third Degree
• Arson in the First Degree
• Compelling Prostitution
• Conspiracy, Attempt, or Solicitation to Commit Aggravated Murder or
Murder
• Manslaughter in the First or Second Degree
• Rape in the First Second, or Third Degree
• Sodomy in the First Second, or Third Degree
• Unlawful Sexual Penetration in the First or Second Degree
• Sexual Abuse in the First or Second Degree
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Burglary in the First or Second Degree
Aggravated Theft
Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle (if committed by taking, operating, or
exercising control over the vehicle)
Criminal Mischief in the First Degree (if the aggregate value of the damage
or destruction of property exceeds $10,000)
The "major crimes" that are also Measure 11 crimes already require mandatory
minimum sentences of 70 months or more. This is well in excess of the 14-month
presumptive sentence specified by Measure 61. (For substantial and compelling
reasons, a court may choose not to apply Measure 11 's mandatory minimum
sentence to Robbery and Assault in the Second Degree; Measure 61's
presumptive sentence of 14 months, however, is likely to have little bearing on
these downward "departures.") For Measure 11 crimes, Measure 61's only effect
would be to add, in the event of previous major crime convictions, an additional
one to three years to the mandatory sentence.
For the "major crimes" that are subject to the increased presumptive sentences
for repeat offenders specified by the legislature in 1996, the principal effects of
Measure 61 would be: (1) to establish a presumptive sentence of 14 months in
prison for first-time and other offenders who do not have the required criminal
history to trigger the increased presumptive sentences under the 1996 legislation
(and for whom the current presumptive sentence is generally probation), and (2)
to require additional incarceration of from 1 to 3 years for repeat offenders.
B. Financial Effects of Measure 61
The state's official Estimate of Financial Impact (EFT) forecasts that Measure 61
would require 4,300 new prison beds by 2006 at a construction and start-up cost
of $470 million. Direct state expenditures for prison operating costs and debt
service would increase from $21 million in 1999-2000 to $125 million in 2005-
2006. State payments to counties for probation and post-prison supervision
would be reduced by $800,000 to $1.9 million per year because fewer offenders
would receive probation. Direct state expenditures for court operations and
indigent defense would increase by approximately $1 million per year by 2001-
2002. In sum, if the EH is accurate, Measure 61 would cost the state
approximately $168 million by the end of the next biennial budget cycle in 2001
and more than $1 billion over the next 10 years.
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To place these numbers in perspective, state general fund and lottery spending
in the 1997-99 biennium is $9.4 billion, of which $1.3 billion is budgeted for
public safety programs, including $836 million for adult and youth corrections.
The budget for adult and youth corrections is an increase of nearly 40 percent
from the 1995-97 biennium. Expressed as percentages of state general fund and
lottery spending in the 1997-99 biennium, Measure 61's estimated increase in
state expenditures of $168 million during the 1999-2001 biennium is
approximately 1.8 percent of total expenditures, but approximately 20 percent of
adult and youth corrections expenditures, which are increasing rapidly even
without Measure 61.
The EH is necessarily based on a number of predictions concerning the reactions
of the criminal justice system to Measure 61. These include the plea bargaining
practices of prosecutors, the sentencing practices of judges with respect to
presumptive sentences, the number of arrests for "major crimes," prior criminal
histories of offenders, and the degree to which additional prison beds will need
to be minimum or medium security beds. Because these factors are difficult to
predict with any great degree of accuracy, the actual financial effects of the
measure on the state may be quite different from those stated in the EH.
Proponents of Measure 61 have strenuously argued that the EFI substantially
overstates the measure's financial effects. They note that the EFI for Measure 11
significantly overstated the financial effects of that measure, which they attribute
to a reduction in violent crime caused by the deterrent effects of the measure.
Others have suggested that the overstatement was due (1) to a general,
nationwide drop in the rate of violent crime that had nothing to do with
Measure 11, and (2) to Measure 11 crimes being plea bargained down to non-
Measure 11 crimes in order to avoid the measure's mandatory minimum
sentences. The proponents, however, do not dispute that Measure 61 would
likely require the construction of a new prison of 2,200 to 2,800 beds. This would
require direct state expenditures for construction and operating costs of at least
several hundred million dollars over the next 10 years.
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III. ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON
A. Arguments Advanced in Favor of the Measure
The measure will lengthen sentences, particularly for property crimes and
repeat offenders. The sentencing guidelines and other laws do not impose
sentences that sufficiently reflect the seriousness of the crimes listed in the
measure.
The increased sentences required by the measure will reduce crime,
particularly property crime, by keeping crirninals incarcerated longer and
by deterring others from committing crimes.
By requiring longer sentences that must be served in state prisons rather
than local jails, the measure will shift some of the costs and problems of
dealing with inmates from local governments to the state, which is better
able to pay the costs and solve the problems.
B. Arguments Advanced Against the Measure
The measure will have little or no effect on crime rates and may encourage
some young offenders to become career criminals by requiring long-term
incarceration without incentives for rehabilitation.
The measure's mandatory and presumptive sentences will further limit the
ability of judges to tailor sentences to fit the crime and the criminal history
of the offender. Instead, the measure will give prosecutors an inappropriate
degree of discretion to dictate sentences through their charging decisions,
and the criminal justice system will be distorted by plea bargaining crimes
down to offenses outside the measure in order to avoid its mandatory
sentencing provisions.
The measure will impose substantial financial burdens on the state without
identifying a new source of funding or specifying what existing spending
should be reduced.
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The mandatory sentences required by the measure will create prison
disciplinary problems by eliminating incentives for proper behavior and
rehabilitation.
IV. DISCUSSION
Two principal arguments have been advanced for Measure 61. The first is that it
will provide more appropriate punishment for serious crimes that are now
treated too leniently. The second is that it will reduce crime, particularly
property crime, by removing career criminals from the streets and deterring
future crimes by others. These arguments and arguments against the measure
are discussed below.
A. Punishment
Although the proponents of Measure 61 are sincere in their belief that the
measure will substantially reduce crime, the first section of the measure makes
plain another purpose that is perhaps more significant to the proponents: "The
purpose of this Act is to protect the public by imposing tougher sentences on
criminals who repeatedly violate major criminal laws and to ensure that all
criminals are held accountable and punished for major crimes...." (Emphasis
added.) Moreover, in his interview with the committee, proponent Steve Doell
stated that the "first goal" of Measure 61 "is to provide appropriate punishment
for serious felony property offenders" and the "second goal is to provide an
effective deterrent to repeated criminal conduct involving property crimes."
Your committee is not unsympathetic to the view that the criminal justice
system should do more than endeavor to protect the public from future crimes.
For most crime victims, it is the completed crime against them or their family
and friends that is of concern, not potential future crimes. Even relatively minor
property crimes that cause little physical or financial harm can deeply offend
our senses of justice and well-being. A sentence that appears to treat a crime too
lightly may only compound the offense, no matter how appropriate the
sentence may be for protecting the public from future crimes.
Measure 61, however, offers little comfort to our senses of justice and well-being.
First, it has no element of proportionality. It would apply the same mandatory
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and presumptive sentences to a wide range of crimes and offenders. A second
conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle would merit the same
sentence enhancement as a second conviction of first degree manslaughter or
rape. A first degree robbery conviction would merit the same sentence
enhancement as a third degree robbery conviction. A first degree criminal
mischief conviction would merit a sentence enhancement under the measure
but kidnapping would not. Indeed, little thought appears to have been given to
the specific crimes included in the measure.
Second, packing off an offender for a lengthy stay in a state prison, where the
offender is simply serving his or her time, is not always the best means of doing
justice to the crime or the victims. Especially for property offenses, a sentence
that includes a limited period of local confinement combined with restitution to
the victims, service to the community, and treatment for drug or alcohol abuse
would seem to offer greater opportunities for ensuring that justice is done and
for restoring the victims' and the community's sense of well-being.
This is not to say that the sentences imposed for some crimes should not be
increased. The high percentage of upward departures in sentences for repeated
property offenses, discussed above, suggests that judges may have believed that
the sentencing guidelines were too lenient in these circumstances. The
legislature's 1996 enactment of longer presumptive sentences for certain
repeated property crimes was a response to this. But Measure 61 paints with a
brush that is too broad. If criminal sentences need to be increased for reasons of
justice, the increases should be justified with some particularity. Measure 61's
proponents have not done that. The measure's wholesale increases in prison
sentences appear to be motivated by no principle of justice higher than
incarcerating as many offenders as possible, as far away as possible, for as long
as possible.
B. Deterrence
The other principal argument for Measure 61 is that it will reduce crime,
particularly the property and other "major crimes" defined in the measure that
are not already subject to Measure 11. Its proponents contend that it will do this
both by incarcerating criminals for longer periods, thereby preventing them
from committing further crimes, and by deterring others.
Obviously, incarceration will drastically limit the opportunities for an offender
to commit additional crimes against the public while the offender is
incarcerated. It is also reasonable to believe that the prospect of longer
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incarceration would have some deterrent effect on others. But your committee
found little evidence that the additional incarceration required by Measure 61
would substantially reduce crime.
As discussed above, the rates for both violent and property crimes in Oregon are
essentially the same now as they were 20 years ago. The incarceration rate over
that period, however, has approximately doubled. One cannot conclude from
this that the rate of incarceration has no effect on crime—the crime rate, after all,
might have been higher in the absence of the higher incarceration rate. But it is
difficult to discern from the data any relationship between the crime rate and the
rate of incarceration. In particular, the evidence does not support the
proponents' contention that Measure 11 is responsible for reducing the violent
crime rate. The rate of violent crime in Oregon has fluctuated from year to year,
but the overall trend has been downward since 1985, well before the adoption of
Measure 11 in 1994. Moreover, violent crime rates have fallen nationally
throughout the 1990s, both in states that have required longer terms of
incarceration and in those that have not.
The proponents contend that deterrence is more effective for property crimes
than violent crimes because the decision to commit a property crime is more
likely to involve a weighing of risks and potential benefits. Again, however,
there is no strong association in the available data between incarceration rates
and property crime rates. Oregon property crime rates fell in the 1980s, rose
again in the early 1990s, and now appear to be falling again. Although
sentencing practices for property crimes may have had some effect on the
property crime rate, none of these shifts in the rate can be clearly attributed to
shifts in sentencing practices.
There are many reasons why increases in sentences for property crimes might
not be expected to have a substantial effect on property crime rates. One reason
is that an arrest is made for only a small percentage of property crimes. It is a
commonplace that punishment is an effective deterrent only when it is certain
and swiftly applied. The prospect of a longer term of incarceration is likely to be
a weak deterrent when the chances of being apprehended are slim and the extra
term of incarceration will not be served until many months or years in the
future. Another reason for a lack of deterrence is that many persons who
commit property crimes are drug addicts. The slim prospect of additional
incarceration at some indefinite time in the future is unlikely to weigh heavily
against the immediate need to satisfy the addiction.
With respect to the violent crimes that are addressed by both Measure 11 and
Measure 61, it is difficult to believe that a prison term of from one to three years
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in addition to a mandatory minimum term of from 5 years and lOmonths to 10
years would have a significant deterrent effect. The additional term would
ensure that the public is protected from the offender that much longer, but the
effect on the overall crime rate is likely to be minuscule. Moreover, if more
prison time were appropriate for some Measure 11 offenders, it would be better
to address that issue directly rather than as a byproduct of Measure 61.
Incarceration and the threat of incarceration are essential components of any
modern criminal justice system. There is little evidence, however, that the
additional incarceration required by Measure 61 is likely to have a substantial
effect on Oregon crime rates.
C Cost
The official EFI forecasts that Measure 61 will result in prison construction and
operating costs of more than $1 billion over the next decade. This forecast, which
the proponents of Measure 61 strongly dispute, is based on a number of
assumptions that may or may not prove to be accurate. But even the proponents
agree that the measure is likely to require 2,200 to 2,800 new prison beds, which
would cost at least half of the EFI, or several hundred million dollars.
Measure 61's problematic effects on the community's sense of justice and its
doubtful reductions in the crime rate cannot be justified by its enormous cost.
Indeed, your committee was told that cost was the reason that Oregon's
relatively conservative legislature declined during the last session to approve a
bill very similar to Measure 61.
The measure's proponents argue that government's highest priority must be the
protection of the life and property of its citizens because everything else,
whether it be commerce, education, culture, or the environment, depends on a
secure and ordered society. Your committee does not disagree. The committee
also does not disagree that prisons are a necessary element of the government's
ability to protect life and property. But the question posed by Measure 61 is
whether the additional prison time that it proposes would promote justice and
increase public safety to a degree justified by its costs. It is not simply a matter of
taking money that could be used for schools and transportation—which
desperately need money and which also enhance security by eliminating
ignorance, teaching social skills, and creating economic well-being—but also a
matter of taking money that could be used for other elements of the criminal
justice system, such as local jails, the police, the courts, and prevention,
rehabilitation, and restitution programs. Providing additional funds to these
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other elements might do more to promote justice and reduce crime than
building additional prison space for offenders who would be subject to Measure
61. For example, there is some evidence to suggest that spending money for
increased police enforcement combined with placing more offenders in jail but
for shorter periods of time would do more to reduce crime than spending the
same amount of money to build more prison space.
In the absence of clearer evidence that Measure 61 is likely to achieve its
objectives of promoting justice and substantially reducing crime, the certainty of
its enormous costs is a compelling argument against it.
D. Sentencing Policy
The fundamental attribute of Oregon's sentencing guidelines is rationality.
There may be disagreement about whether the presumptive sentences specified
by individual grid blocks are too long or too short, or, as is the case with
Measure 61 's proponents, there may be disagreement about whether the
presumptive sentences are in general too long or too short. But the processes by
which presumptive sentences are established and sentences are imposed under
the guidelines are, or are supposed to be, rational. The relative lengths of
presumptive sentences are established on the basis of the relative severity of the
crime and the criminal history of the offender. Actual sentences may be adjusted
in individual cases for compelling reasons. The overall lengths of presumptive
sentences may be adjusted to reflect the resources that the legislature and,
ultimately, the voters are willing to allocate to prisons. These are the types of
considerations that a reasonable person would take into account in determining
an appropriate sentence.
Measure 61, like Measure 11, is fundamentally irrational. That is not to say that a
rational person could not, in any given case, decide to impose the same sentence
that Measure 61 would require. Rather, it is the process of establishing and
imposing sentences under the measure that is irrational.
Under Measure 61's mandatory sentencing provisions, all offenders who have
been convicted of one, two, or three or more "major crimes" must serve,
respectively, one, two, or three additional years of prison. From the standpoint
of sentencing policy, this is objectionable on its face for several reasons.
First, there has been no budget process for the prison space needed to
accommodate these additional sentences. Would this substantial amount of
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money be better spent on schools? Would it be better spent on additional police
officers, local jail space, or other elements of the criminal justice system? Would
it be better left in the pockets of taxpayers? Under the sentencing guidelines, the
legislature can address these issues through the state budgeting process and
adjust the presumptive sentences accordingly. The voters cannot consider, and
may not even be aware of, these alternatives in voting on Measure 61.
Second, the additional mandatory sentences required by Measure 61 appear to
be wholly arbitrary. For example, it is unclear why the measure requires two
additional years for two previous convictions of a "major crime." Would three
years or 18 months better serve the purposes of the measure? So far as the
committee could ascertain, the lengths of the additional terms were not selected
with the expectation that they would achieve any particular result.
Third, the additional mandatory sentences are not proportional to the
seriousness of the crimes for which the sentences are imposed or the seriousness
of the crimes previously committed. A person who has been convicted of
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle with three previous convictions of
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (which may have been imposed in the
same proceeding for three separate thefts) would be required to serve an
additional three years just as would a person who has been convicted of first
degree manslaughter with three or more previous convictions of any
combination of "major crimes" such as first degree manslaughter, first degree
robbery, or first degree burglary of an occupied dwelling. Under Measure 61, a
judge has no discretion to treat these two offenders differently.
Fourth, the lack of sentencing discretion is likely to lead to a serious distortion in
the criminal justice system that is similar to the distortion that has been created
by Measure 11. Because of the injustice of imposing the mandatory minimum
sentence in a particular case, the prosecutor, through plea bargaining, will
charge the defendant with a lesser offense that is not subject to the mandatory
minimum sentence. This distorts the criminal justice system in two ways.
Persons are convicted of crimes that are less serious than the crimes that they
actually committed. In addition, the function of tailoring sentences to fit the
crime is transferred from neutral judges, where it properly lies, to prosecutors,
who can impose a longer or shorter sentence by choosing which crime to
prosecute.
Finally, Measure 61's mandatory sentences for repeat offenders could not be
reduced for good behavior or participation in certain prison programs, as
ordinary prison sentences (but not Measure 11 sentences) may be. This would
preclude an important incentive for good behavior in prison and for
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preclude an important incentive for good behavior in prison and for
rehabilitation. If the concern is that offenders should serve an absolute
minimum period in prison, the length of the sentence could be increased to
ensure that the rninimum is served even with reductions. That would largely
preserve the incentives for good behavior and rehabilitation without reducing
the desired minimum sentence length. Because some of Measure 61's
mandatory sentences would be additions to base sentences that are subject to
reductions for good behavior and participation in certain prison programs, its
effects with respect to this issue would be ameliorated somewhat. Still, there is
no good reason to prohibit such reductions.
Measure 61 's 14-month minimum presumptive sentence for all "major crimes"
is somewhat less objectionable on policy grounds than the mandatory additional
sentences. One could reasonably reach the conclusion that all "major crimes" are
sufficiently serious that they merit at least a presumptive prison sentence of 14
months, whether or not the increase in presumptive sentence lengths would
substantially reduce crime. As a presumptive sentence, judges would have the
discretion, subject to certain limits, to impose a shorter sentence if the
circumstances of the crime or the individual offender merited it. Nonetheless,
the 14-month presumptive sentence, like the mandatory additional sentences,
would substantially increase the need for prison space without an opportunity
to consider budgetary alternatives.
Your committee strongly believes that the sentencing guidelines provide a
rational mechanism for setting sentences. The guidelines allow appropriate
consideration of budgetary alternatives, the relative seriousness of crimes and
the criminal history of the offender, and effects on other portions of the criminal
justice system. If the presumptive sentences under the guidelines appear to be
too low, either in general or for specific crimes, the appropriate course would be
for the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission or the Oregon Legislature to
consider increases in the presumptive sentences after evaluating budgetary
alternatives and the effects that the increases would have on the criminal justice
system. Mandating minimum sentences and increasing presumptive sentences
outside this process, as Measure 61 would do, is the very sort of uncoordinated,
unreflective sentencing policy that the sentencing guidelines were intended to
avoid.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Measure 61 is addressed to the public's continuing frustration with crime and
the perceived leniency of presumptive sentences under the current sentencing
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and reduce crime by imposing additional mandatory sentences for repeated
"major crimes" and by establishing a minimum presumptive prison sentence of
14 months for all "major crimes."
The committee was not persuaded that the measure would substantially further
either of its principal goals. Although increased prison sentences may to some
degree assuage the sense of justice of crime victims and of the community at
large, this is counterbalanced by the injustice that is likely to result from the
measure's failure to make any distinction in the seriousness of the broad range
of crimes that it lists as "major crimes." Moreover, justice, particularly for
property crimes, is not always promoted by longer prison sentences. In
appropriate cases, justice for the victims, the community, and the offender may
be better served by short-term jail sentences combined with restitution to the
victims or service to the community.
Your committee found little evidence to support the claims that Measure 61
would substantially reduce crime. The trends in Oregon crime rates over the
past 20 years do not indicate any significant relationship between the period of
incarceration and the crime rate. Demographic and economic factors appear to
have much more influence. Longer sentences would prevent offenders from
committing further crimes against the public while they were incarcerated, but
the number of crimes, particularly property crimes, resolved by an arrest and
conviction is only a small fraction of all crimes. For persons who have not been
arrested, Measure 61 works only through the fear of arrest, conviction, and
incarceration for an extended period of time, but this fear may not be sufficient
for the many property offenders who are satisfying drug addictions or who
believe, correctly or incorrectly, that they are unlikely to be caught.
Your committee's concerns about the ability of Measure 61 to achieve its
purposes would be less significant were it not for the immense cost of the
measure and the existence of an alternative mechanism for achieving those
purposes. The several hundred million to a billion dollars that Measure 61 is
projected to cost over the next decade is far too much money in the absence of
more substantial evidence that the additional incarceration required by the
measure will significantly reduce crime and promote greater justice. Other state
programs, including other criminal justice programs, desperately need the funds
that Measure 61 would require for the construction and operation of new
prisons.
If, as Measure 61 's proponents contend, more offenders should be sentenced to
prison and for longer terms, that can be accomplished in a far more rational
manner through the existing sentencing guidelines. The process of amending
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the guidelines through the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission and the
Oregon Legislature would allow the efficacy and need for the additional prison
terms to be assessed in light of their cost and in light of compering claims for
public funds. The increased periods of incarceration could also be allocated to
the specific types of crimes and criminal histories for which additional
incarceration would most benefit the public. Furthermore, the sentencing
guidelines' aggravating and mitigating factors could be used by judges to adjust
the higher presumptive sentences upward or downward in individual cases for
"substantial and compelling reasons."
The Oregon Legislature used this process in 1996 to increase the presumptive
sentences for certain repeated property crimes after concerns were raised that
the existing presumptive sentences were too lenient. This action demonstrates
that the existing sentencing guidelines can be amended as needed and after due
consideration of the issues described above. Rather than resorting to the
initiative process, which does not allow effective consideration of these
complicated issues, the proponents of Measure 61 should seek to persuade the
legislature that additional incarceration is warranted and that the necessary
funds should be allocated to provide the needed prison space. The merits of the
issues posed by Measure 61 cannot be considered adequately, and should not be
decided, in the context of an initiative campaign.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
Your committee unanimously recommends a "No" vote on Measure 61.
Respectfully submitted,
Tami Chartraw
Greg Dennis
Erika George
Trish Holden
Michael Campbell, Chair
Jim Westwood, research advisor
Paul Leistner, research director
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